“The tyrant feudalism must be declared once and for all deposed and its influence over students of the Middle Ages finally ended” (Elizabeth Brown, 1974)
> A concept like feudalism may have needed to have been taken down a peg or two in the 1970s. But this does not mean that we should be barred from using it today. Indeed, reading Brown’s 1974 essay, one gets the sense that she is fighting battles against foes who simply don’t exist in 2025:
Among historians, probably not. But the popular concept is alive and well. My general impression is - as someone who is neither - that historians tend to see educating the general public as a core responsibility of their field, while political scientists tend to see it as a separate activity which shouldn't really shape insider discourse.
This deserves a longer comment, but one major thing missing from the referenced model (and from much similar theorising) is that a certain amounts and kinds of violence can be - and were - integral to political processes. They were often legitimated by custom or simple forbearance. One thinks of Georgian governance as 'oligarchy tempered by riot', or the refusal of the US federal government over many decades to rule against lynching.
More specifically, medieval elites (and the commoners who shared many of their attitudes, especially about honour) valued violence, were proud of their capacity for violence and saw nothing wrong with exercising it in the right cause. Rulers shared this outlook, so violent 'rebellion' was regarded as a legitimate form of protest, the outcomes validating divine judgement. The religious who provide much of our sources had a more nuanced attitude but even they are mostly concerned to limit it to the right occasions.
The issue with 'feudalism' since Brown, Reynolds, Wickham et al is that post-Roman western Europe, the period of state breakdown in Francia and the post-breakdown gradual emergence of the modern polities involve distinct and different political formations. If you apply one label to them all you might as well extend it to cover all decentralised agrarian polities (of which there are a great many across Afro-Eurasia). So better to ditch it and look at what was actually going on.
As someone who has been involved in both history and social science, I think that historians tend to dismiss the importance of theory and causality and focus largely on thick narrative. Meanwhile, many social scientists focus too much on the present or recent past and neglect the importance of long-term history.
I think that we need more researchers who are comfortable in both domains, as they can promote learn from each other.
> A concept like feudalism may have needed to have been taken down a peg or two in the 1970s. But this does not mean that we should be barred from using it today. Indeed, reading Brown’s 1974 essay, one gets the sense that she is fighting battles against foes who simply don’t exist in 2025:
Among historians, probably not. But the popular concept is alive and well. My general impression is - as someone who is neither - that historians tend to see educating the general public as a core responsibility of their field, while political scientists tend to see it as a separate activity which shouldn't really shape insider discourse.
A compelling take—feudalism may be contested, but your argument shows it still holds analytical value for understanding medieval political economy
This deserves a longer comment, but one major thing missing from the referenced model (and from much similar theorising) is that a certain amounts and kinds of violence can be - and were - integral to political processes. They were often legitimated by custom or simple forbearance. One thinks of Georgian governance as 'oligarchy tempered by riot', or the refusal of the US federal government over many decades to rule against lynching.
More specifically, medieval elites (and the commoners who shared many of their attitudes, especially about honour) valued violence, were proud of their capacity for violence and saw nothing wrong with exercising it in the right cause. Rulers shared this outlook, so violent 'rebellion' was regarded as a legitimate form of protest, the outcomes validating divine judgement. The religious who provide much of our sources had a more nuanced attitude but even they are mostly concerned to limit it to the right occasions.
The issue with 'feudalism' since Brown, Reynolds, Wickham et al is that post-Roman western Europe, the period of state breakdown in Francia and the post-breakdown gradual emergence of the modern polities involve distinct and different political formations. If you apply one label to them all you might as well extend it to cover all decentralised agrarian polities (of which there are a great many across Afro-Eurasia). So better to ditch it and look at what was actually going on.
As someone who has been involved in both history and social science, I think that historians tend to dismiss the importance of theory and causality and focus largely on thick narrative. Meanwhile, many social scientists focus too much on the present or recent past and neglect the importance of long-term history.
I think that we need more researchers who are comfortable in both domains, as they can promote learn from each other.